Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 212647

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TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO SUBJ: COUNCIL AND MIDDLE EAST

REF: (A) USNATO 5179 (B) USNATO 5184

1. YOUR NON-DEFENSIVE STANCE ADOPTED IN DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL AND PERMREP LUNCH IS CORRECT POSTURE. IN FUTURE DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING:

1. ALLIES FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO
SEPARATE ISSUES: ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM PER SE AND
SOVIET INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.
WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY IF NOT MOST OF OUR NATO
ALLIES PURSUE POLICY WITH REGARD TO ARAB-ISRAELI
ISSUE DIFFERENT FROM THAT PURSUED BY US, IF NOT
IN OBJECTIVES AT LEAST IN TACTICS. WE NOT ASKING
ALLIES TO ENDORSE OUR POLICY ON THIS ISSUE BUT
EXPECT THEM TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. SOVIET
INTERVENTION HOWEVER IS DIFFERENT ISSUE
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PAGE 02 STATE 212647

WHICH THREATENED TO RADICALIZE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HARM LONG-TERM WESTERN, INCLUDING NATO, INTERESTS. US RESUPPLY OF ISRAELI WAS TO THWART VICTORY BY THOSE SUPPORTED BY SOVIETS

AND ACHIEVE SITUATION (AS AT PRESENT) WHERE BASIS MIGHT

BE ESTABLISHED FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE. THIS LATTER OBJECTIVE WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY OUR ALLIES.

- 2. THE "MILITARY ALERT" MEASURES OF OCTOBER 25, WHICH ACTUALLY INVOLVED INCREASED READINESS, WERE DIRECTED TO END OF THWARTING SOVIET DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN AREA WITH ALL THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HAVE NOT ONLY FOR MIDDLE EAST BUT ALSO FOR EUROPE.
- 3. WE RECOGNIZE MIDDLE EAST ITSELF NOT PART OF NATO TREATY AREA BUT WE FAIL TO SEE HOW OUR ALLIES CAN BLIND THEMSELVES TO EVENTS IN A CONTIGUOUS AREA, WHEN THEY THREATENED TO WASH OVER INTO THE EUROPEAN AREA GENERALLY, PARTICULARLY WHEN ISSUE IS ONE OF MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ONE SIDE OR EVEN OF A DIRECT SOVIET PRESENCE.
- 4. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MUST HAVE MADE THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN MIDDLE EAST. THESE ASSESSMENTS DOUBTLESS PARALLELED OURS AND WE REGRET THAT THEY DID NOT LEAD TO GREATER ALLIED SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS. FAILURE TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS GENERALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY AND THE POSITION OF MANY ALLIES ON OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING RIGHTS FOR RESUPPLY MISSIONS COMMUNICATED EITHER EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY COMPLICATED OUR TASK, AND LED TO EXPRESSIONS OF US CONCERN VOICED IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT OUR ALLIES DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM US.
- 5. AS TO CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ADVISE ALLIES COLLECTIVELY OF EVERY TURN IN THESE FAST-MOVING CONTACTS BUTTHE FACT OF THESE CONTACTS WAS KNOWN. WE SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 212647

BELIEVE THAT ALLIES KEPT REASONABLY WELL INFORMED ON THESE CONTACTS, WHICH DIRECTED TOWARDS ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE, LAYING BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE GAINED LITTLE FROM MORE DETAILED BRIEFING. MOREOVER, WE MAINTAINED FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THOSE ALLIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN UN DELIBERATIONS AND ACTIONS. ON "ALERT" SITUATION, THIS HAPPENED SUDDENLY WITH SUBMISSION OF A SOVIET COMMUNICATION ON NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24 IN RESPONSE TO WHICH US FELT IT MUST ACT PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY. IT WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH TIME DID NOT PERMIT THE ADVANCE CONSULTATION WE NORMALLY DESIRE. YOU SHOULD ALSO RECALL YOUR COMMUN-ICATION TO COUNCIL ON INSTRUCTIONS ON OCTOBER 25 ON THE ALERT. (THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE PROVIDES NECESSARY BACKGROUND ON THIS ASPECT. YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26.)

- 6. WE AWARE THAT EXTENT OF CONSULTATION WAS NOT WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE LIKED AND WILL SEEK TO TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT IN THE EVOLVING SITUATION CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE. AS A START TO THIS END, THE SECRETARY HAS INSTRUCTED THAT AS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOP, A MEANS BE FOUND TO INFORM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES MORE SWIFTLY AND COMPLETELY.
- 7. WE SHOULD ALL RECOGNIZE THAT STRAINS ON OUR ALLIANCE ARE OF BENEFIT TO NONE BUT OUR ADVERSARIES. THE TIME HAS COME TO CLOSE RANKS, AND ASSIST IN ATTAINING A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
- $8. \ \mbox{WE}$ INTEND TO INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES.
- 9. IF QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING SECDEF'S
 PUBLIC COMENTS REGARDING MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF ALLIES CONDUCT IN THIS CRISIS, YOU SHOULD
 NOTE THEM AND REPORT. KISSINGER

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